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(SOME) MOTHERS KNOW BEST:
A CASE COMMENT ON M.M. v. T.B.
AND THE PLIGHT OF INDIGENOUS
MOTHERS IN CHILD WELFARE AND
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
Catherine Wang
Over time, courts have come to acknowledge the
significance of Indigenous identity when deciding custody
disputes, but they continue to struggle with how much
consideration should be given to the broader history
involved, which can leave Indigenous mothers particularly
disadvantaged in family law proceedings. Not only do
Indigenous mothers have to contend with the law’s general
assumptions and expectations about mothers, they also
have to endure the courts’ often limited ability to situate
mothers’ individual actions in the wider context of
structural barriers erected by government and societal
forces. A close examination of the recent British Columbia
Court of Appeal decision in M.M. v. T.B. provides a useful
example of the challenges that Indigenous mothers can
face, as well as the competing interests that courts must
balance in these circumstances.
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(Peter A. Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia).
First, I would like to acknowledge that I live and learn on the
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INTRODUCTION
Family law is unsurprisingly fraught with tension between
the parties and strong emotional investment in the
outcomes of disputes. When children are present, this
situation is complicated even further. One additional
element that courts are continuously attempting to navigate
is Indigenous identity and its impact on determining a
child’s best interests. Over time, courts have come to
acknowledge the significance of Indigenous identity when
deciding custody disputes, but they continue to struggle
with how much consideration should be given to the
broader history involved, which can leave Indigenous
mothers particularly disadvantaged in family law
proceedings. Not only do Indigenous mothers have to
contend with the law’s general assumptions and
expectations about mothers, they also have to endure the
courts’ often limited ability to situate mothers’ individual
actions in the wider context of structural barriers erected by
government and societal forces. A close examination of the
recent British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in M.M.
v. T.B.1 provides a useful example of the challenges that
Indigenous mothers can face, as well as the competing
interests that courts must balance in these circumstances.

1

MM v TB, 2017 BCCA 296, 100 BCLR (5th) 286.
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BACKGROUND
FACTS
On December 31, 2006, T.B. gave birth to R when she was
20 years old.2 She had struggled with addiction for many
years, and after cocaine was discovered in R’s bloodstream
when he was born, he was immediately taken into care by
the Ministry of Children and Family Development. Two
days later, R’s maternal grandmother, B.B., applied for
sole custody of R. T.B. supported her application and, five
months later in 2007, B.B. was granted sole custody and
guardianship of R.
B.B., her husband N.K., T.B., and R are all
members of the Splatsin Band, which is part of the
Shuswap Nation.3 B.B. was suffering from poor health and
depression, so in 2008 the Band arranged for M.M. and
R.M. to provide assistance with caring for R and for T.B.’s
first born, M.I., who was also in B.B.’s care. M.M. is a
member of the Songhees First Nation and R.M. is not
Indigenous; they had no children of their own but were
interested in adopting Indigenous children. After B.B. met
with M.M. and R.M. and agreed that they were suitable
caregivers, they began taking care of R and M.I. on
2

The facts in this section have been summarized from the trial decision:
British Columbia Birth Registration No XX-XX297 (Re), 2015 BCSC
1577, 71 RFL (7th) 432 at paras 6–31 [BC Birth Registration].

3

Note that the trial judge refers to the “Shuswap” Nation while the Court
of Appeal refers to the “Secwepemc” Nation. “The Secwepemc People
[are] known by non-natives as the Shuswap” (Secwepemc Cultural
Education
Society,
Our
Story
(Kamloops),
online:
<http://www.secwepemc.org/our-story.html>).
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weekends. In late 2008, B.B. asked M.M. and R.M. to take
care of R full time for a few months and, with the Band’s
approval and funding, the couple began to do so. In 2009,
B.B. asked the couple to keep R.4 They agreed, and by the
end of that year the Band had made its last payment and
ceased to be involved.
For the next three years, B.B. visited R and the M
family approximately every two months. During that time,
T.B. made around seven to ten visits to R, which were
always supervised by M.M. and R.M. T.B. was in and out
of jail and continued to struggle with addiction until 2011,
when she made significant changes in her life. That
summer, B.B. began having overnight visits with R, and in
August she requested all of his identification so that she
could take him on an overnight trip across the border. After
B.B. and T.B. refused to return R as promised, M.M. and
R.M. applied for and were granted sole interim custody and
guardianship of R, as well as a restraining and noncommunication order against B.B. and T.B. Ten days later,
R was removed from B.B. and T.B.’s care by the police.
They have not seen him since that day in 2011.
Over the next year, T.B. and B.B. began and
abandoned a number of applications to regain custody and
guardianship of R. M.M. and R.M. made repeated offers
for supervised visits, but B.B. and T.B. did not accept. The
couple commenced a proceeding in 2012 seeking to adopt

4

BB strongly denied that she had placed R for customary adoption with
MM and RM, but the trial judge ultimately found that BB did indeed
make such a request. See BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at paras
16 and 35–47.
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R, contrary to the wishes of B.B., T.B., and the Splatsin
Band.
THE TRIAL DECISION
There were three main issues at trial:5
1.

2.

3.

Does the Court have jurisdiction to make an
adoption order when the petitioners have not
met some of the requirements of the Adoption
Act?6
If so, should the birth mother’s consent be
dispensed with and is the adoption in R’s best
interest?
If the adoption order is not made, should the
respondents be awarded guardianship of R?

In regard to issue one, Madam Justice Fenlon
concluded that there is a gap in the Adoption Act. She
determined that this was “an appropriate case to exercise
the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court to fill the gap
in the legislation and to consider the petitioners’
application for adoption despite the absence of pre- and
post-placement reports and notices”.7
The second issue was the heart of the case and
centered on a careful review of section three of the
Adoption Act:

5

BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 4.

6

Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5.

7

BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 77.
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Best interests of child8
3 (1) All relevant factors must be considered in
determining the child's best interests,
including for example:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(e)

(f)
(g)
(h)

the child's safety;
the child's physical and emotional
needs and level of development;
the importance of continuity in the
child's care;
the importance to the child's
development of having a positive
relationship with a parent and a secure
place as a member of a family;
the quality of the relationship the
child has with a parent or other
individual and the effect of
maintaining that relationship;
the child's cultural, racial, linguistic
and religious heritage;
the child's views;
the effect on the child if there is delay
in making a decision.

(2) If the child is an aboriginal child, the
importance of preserving the child's cultural
identity must be considered in determining
the child's best interests.

8

Adoption Act, supra note 6, s 3.
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After considering the test for determining the best
interests of the child;9 the psychologist’s assessment that R
had bonded completely with M.M., R.M., and their other
two adopted Indigenous children;10 the M family’s ability
to teach R about his Indigenous heritage;11 and R’s own
wishes,12 Madam Justice Fenlon decided “that it is in R’s
best interest to remain with and to be adopted by the
petitioners, with access to T.B.” in the form of three
supervised visits per year.13
Next, Madam Justice Fenlon looked to see if T.B.’s
consent to the adoption should be dispensed with, and she
found that of the possible reasons under section 17 of the
Adoption Act, section 17(1)(d) was the applicable
provision: “other circumstances justify dispensing with the
consent”.14 In concluding that it was in R’s best interest to
dispense with T.B.’s consent to the adoption, Madam
Justice Fenlon emphasized the lack of a meaningful parentchild relationship between T.B. and R, as well as R’s own
awareness of the adoption proceedings.15

9

BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 80.

10

Ibid at para 82.

11

Ibid at paras 84–86.

12

Ibid at para 91.

13

Ibid at paras 92, 103.

14

Ibid at paras 97–98.

15

Ibid at paras 100–01.
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THE APPEAL DECISION
T.B. did not challenge Madam Justice Fenlon’s findings of
fact, and “[t]he single ground of appeal [she] advanced . . .
is that the judge erred in law by failing to correctly
interpret, and therefore to properly weigh, the s[ection]
3(2) factor”.16 In particular, T.B. submitted that “while the
judge considered the child’s Aboriginal heritage and the
importance of preserving his cultural identity in general,
she erred in failing to specifically consider the
‘ameliorative’ purpose of s[ection] 3(2)”.17 Although the
statutory interpretation of section 3(2) was not raised at
trial, the Court of Appeal addressed and ultimately rejected
this argument, explaining that when “determining whether
an adoption order should be made, a child’s Aboriginal
heritage and cultural identity does not attract a ‘superweight’ over the other factors”.18 The Court concluded that
such an expanded interpretation was not supported by the
text of the statute, and that the trial judge made no error in
regard to section 3(2) because “[t]he evidence
overwhelmingly supported her decision that making the
adoption order was in the best interests of the child”.19 In
addition to dismissing the appeal, the Court clarified the
analysis from another British Columbia Court of Appeal
judgment, which was rendered in 2016 and concerned the

16

MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 11.

17

Ibid at para 12.

18

Ibid at para 15.

19

Ibid at para 96.
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adoption of a Métis child by a couple who are not of Métis
descent.20
ANALYSIS
M.M. v. T.B. vividly illustrates the disadvantages and
obstacles that Indigenous mothers can encounter in child
welfare and adoption proceedings. Explicitly and
implicitly in both the trial judge’s decision and the Court
of Appeal’s decision are references to the difficult
circumstances against which T.B. and B.B. struggled—
circumstances that were not solely the result of their
individual choices, but rather situations linked to a much
broader and heavier context. However, the judgments—
particularly the judgment from the Court of Appeal—do
not fully acknowledge that T.B. and B.B. were not wholly
and personally responsible for the conditions that led to R’s
adoption. The object of this paper is not to prove that it was,
in fact, in R’s best interests to stay with T.B. and B.B.
Instead, the aim is to highlight the Courts’ failure to explore
T.B. and B.B.’s identities as Indigenous mothers, whose
lives have therefore been fundamentally impacted by
colonialism and racial oppression.
THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY OF MOTHERHOOD
A helpful starting point for effectively analyzing and
understanding the key issues arising out of the case is
Professor Marlee Kline’s renowned 1993 article entitled
“Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare
20

Ibid at para 61. The Court reviewed the analysis in LM v British
Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services), 2016
BCCA 367, 89 BCLR (5th) 362.
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Law and First Nation Women”.21 Professor Kline
discussed the meaning and implications of “the dominant
ideology of motherhood”, which she described as:
. . . the constellation of ideas and images in
western capitalist societies that constitute the
dominant ideals of motherhood against which
women’s lives are judged. The expectations
established by these ideals limit and shape the
choices women make in their lives, and
construct the dominant criteria of ‘good’ and
‘bad’ mothering. They exist within a
framework of dominant ideologies of
womanhood, which, in turn, intersect with
dominant ideologies of family.22
Motherhood is viewed as the natural and desired
goal for women.23 They are expected to embrace primary
responsibility for their children and operate as part of a
heterosexual, nuclear, patriarchal family.24 If mothers
deviate from the ideals of motherhood, they are
characterized as bad mothers, “thereby justifying their
social and legal regulation, including regulation by child
welfare law”.25 Unfortunately, Indigenous mothers are
especially vulnerable to being marked as bad mothers and

21

Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child
Welfare Law and First Nation Women” (1993) 18:2 Queen’s LJ 306.

22

Ibid at 310 [emphasis added].

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid at 310–11.

25

Ibid at 312.
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losing custody of their children.26 Although Professor
Kline’s article is over 20 years old, it provides a revealing
lens with which to review M.M. v. T.B. The case, in turn,
offers an opportunity to assess whether the law has moved
in a more positive direction since the article’s publication.
More recent scholarship in the area of child welfare
law demonstrates how Professor Kline’s analysis continues
to be a relevant and appropriate tool for studying cases such
as M.M. v. T.B. In 2013, Professor Susan Boyd wrote that
“[b]ecause ideological expectations have shifted over time,
any clear dichotomy between good and bad mothers is now
difficult to sustain”.27 For instance, “equality has become a
dominant norm”, and fathers are more engaged with their
children’s lives than they once were.28 Nevertheless, she
argued that “motherhood remains an institution that
contributes to women’s systematic inequality”,29 and
“[m]others who are already marginalized, notably as a
result of poverty, race or aboriginality, are most vulnerable
to being labelled ‘unfit’”.30 Similarly, a recent examination
of how courts in British Columbia adjudicate applications
by the state to permanently remove children from their
mothers found that, in the cases that were reviewed, “the
most dominant theme . . . is that women are blamed and
26

Ibid at 340.

27

Susan B Boyd, “Motherhood and Law: Constructing and Challenging
Normativity” in Vanessa E Munro & Margaret Davies, eds, The
Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Farnham:
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013) 267 at 271.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid at 280.

30

Ibid at 269.
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found responsible for the desperate social circumstances in
which they find themselves”.31 The dire situations
described in these decisions were “often related to poverty,
mental disability/addiction, homelessness, male violence,
the intergenerational impact of the child protection system,
and the tragic legacy of residential schools and the removal
of Indigenous children from their families”.32
From the opening paragraphs of both the trial and
appeal decisions, it is evident that T.B. is someone who has
not adhered to the dominant ideology of motherhood. In
contrast, R’s adoptive mother, M.M., largely meets the
supposed criteria of a good mother according to the
ideology. Rather than accepting motherhood as her
ultimate objective, T.B. lost custody of her son when he
was born, after which she supported the child’s
grandmother in her application to become his primary
caregiver instead.33 She also allowed M.M. and R.M. to
take over this role later on, and failed to maximize her
opportunities to visit R.34 Furthermore, R’s biological
father was not involved in his life,35 and prior to R’s birth,
T.B. had already surrendered her first born child to her
parents’ custody.36 By comparison, M.M. had been married
to R.M. for 22 years at the time of the trial, and she was
31

Judith Mosoff et al, “Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child
Protection Law in BC” (2017) 50:2 UBC L Rev 435 at 501.

32

Ibid.

33

BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at paras 6–7.

34

Ibid at para 19.

35

MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 5.

36

BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 6 and 22.
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eager to bring children into her life.37 She and her husband
adopted another boy and girl, meaning R would be joining
a quintessential family unit where he would have two
parents and siblings.38
M.M.’s ability to care for and love R is not in dispute, but
the Courts do not adequately reflect on the factors that may
have prevented T.B. from wanting or trying to do the same
in R’s earliest years. T.B.’s deviation from the expectations
demanded by the dominant ideology of motherhood are not
specifically recognized as being the consequence of a
longer narrative. For example, the trial decision mentions
in one line that T.B.’s mother, B.B., had her own
experiences with the child welfare law system, when “the
Band’s social workers removed some of B.B.’s and N.K.’s
children from their care”.39 At some point in the past, B.B.
was also categorized as an unfit mother; this is an event that
adds another dimension to T.B. and B.B.’s personal
histories, since “[t]he effects of child welfare involvement
are felt multi-generationally”.40 The Courts’ decisions
regarding R, however, do not make enough room to
consider the reasons beyond B.B. and T.B.’s control for
why they found themselves in a position where the state
felt that intervening in their lives was justified. As
37

Ibid at para 12.

38

Ibid at para 82.

39

Ibid at para 10.

40

Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises: Parents Speak about BC's
Child Welfare System (Vancouver: Pivot Legal Society, 2008) at 10,
online:
<https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pivotlegal/pages/82/attachm
ents/original/1345747631/BrokenPromises.pdf?1345747631>.
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Professor Kline observed, by presenting the expectations
that constitute good mothering as “natural, necessary, and
universal”, bad mothering is constructed as the opposite,
“with the operation of racism and other such factors
rendered invisible. Moreover, the realities of poverty,
racism, heterosexism, and violence that often define the
lives of mothers who do not conform to the ideology are
effectively erased.”41 In M.M. v. T.B., the erasure takes
place when the Court neglects to connect T.B. and B.B.’s
individual problems to the surrounding colonial context.
THE LONG SHADOW OF COLONIALISM
A quarter of a century after Professor Kline’s article was
published, the devastating impact of colonial oppression on
Indigenous peoples can still be seen in every aspect of
society. For instance, in 2015-16 Indigenous adults
accounted for 26 percent of admissions to provincial and
territorial correctional services, despite representing about
3 percent of the Canadian adult population.42 Indigenous
peoples are also “disproportionately homeless and
inadequately housed”,43 less likely to graduate from high

41

Kline, supra note 21 at 315 [emphasis added].

42

Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2015/2016
(Statistics Canada, 2017), online: <www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002x/2017001/article/14700-eng.htm>
[Statistics
Canada,
Adult
Correctional Statistics].

43

Carly Patrick, Aboriginal Homelessness in Canada: A Literature
Review (Toronto: Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press,
2014)
at
10,
online:
<www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/AboriginalLiteratureReview
.pdf>.
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school,44 and at particular risk for substance abuse and
addiction compared to the non-Indigenous population.45 In
addition, Indigenous women generally fare even worse
than Indigenous men. Overrepresentation in admissions to
provincial and territorial correctional services is more
pronounced for Indigenous women than for their male
counterparts,46 and “there are disproportionately more
Indigenous women . . . living in poverty and facing hunger
and homelessness”.47 These facts are a backdrop for the
challenges that B.B. and T.B. encountered as Indigenous
mothers.
The Court of Appeal noted that T.B. “struggled
with addiction issues and lived on the street between the
ages of 17 and 24. During that time, she was in and out of
jail for various matters”.48 T.B.’s difficult journey cannot
be divorced from the barriers facing Indigenous peoples as
44

Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Victimization in Canada: A Summary of
the
Literature
(Statistics
Canada,
2017),
online:
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rd3-rr3/p3.html>.

45

Library of Parliament, Current Issues in Mental Health in Canada:
Directions in Federal Substance Abuse Policy (Parliamentary
Information and Research Service, 2014) at 2.2.1.2, online:
<https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPubli
cations/201406E>.

46

Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Statistics, supra note 42.

47

Dawn Memee Lavell-Harvard & Jeannette Corbiere Lavell, “What
More Do You People Want? The Unique Needs of Aboriginal Mothers
in a Modern Context” in Andrea O’Reilly, ed, What Do Mothers Need?
Motherhood Activists and Scholars Speak Out on Maternal
Empowerment for the 21st Century (Bradford, ON: Demeter Press,
2012) 107 at 107.

48

MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 16.
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a whole, but the judgment does not acknowledge how her
addiction, homelessness, and incarceration were tied to a
broader picture. While the Court does not engage in overt
mother-blaming of the type Professor Kline identified in
her article,49 the omission of context for T.B.’s
circumstances still implies that she failed to be a suitable
mother, when in fact the odds were stacked against her
from the beginning. Similarly, when M.M. and R.M. began
providing weekend respite care for R, it was because B.B.
was experiencing what the Court of Appeal called “health
problems”.50 The trial decision is more specific and
transparent: B.B. was simultaneously caring for R and
T.B.’s first born child, and she was “suffering from poor
health and depression at that time”.51 These details allow
connections to be drawn between B.B.’s individual need
for assistance and the obstacles facing Indigenous peoples,
who are more likely to experience physical and mental
illness than non-Indigenous people.52 Unfortunately, the
trial judge does not explicitly make the link between B.B.’s
health troubles and the disadvantages plaguing Indigenous
communities.

49

See e.g. Kline, supra note 21 at 321.

50

MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 18.

51

BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 11.

52

See Naomi Adelson, “The Embodiment of Inequity: Health Disparities
in Aboriginal Canada” (2005) 96:2 Can J Public Health 45 & see
Laurence J Kirmayer, Gregory M Brass & Caroline L Tait, “The
Mental Health of Aboriginal Peoples: Transformations of Identity and
Community” (2000) 45:7 Can J Psychiatry 607.
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THE LACK OF FOCUS ON BIG PICTURE
SOLUTIONS
In making her determination that it would be in R’s best
interests to be adopted by M.M. and R.M., and that the
Court should dispense with T.B.’s consent, Madam Justice
Fenlon wrote that “there is in this case effectively no
existing parent-child relationship between T.B. and R”.53
It can be argued, however, that the state’s actions—or
rather, lack of actions—played a significant role in
jeopardizing the parent-child relationship between mother
and son from the outset.
In her article, Professor Kline observed that “[c]hild
protection workers are directed to identify and design
treatment for the problematic behaviours of individual
caregivers, not to document and develop responses to
problems of poverty, racism, and violence, and the way
these affect women’s lives”.54 More than 20 years later,
government focus on addressing larger, overarching
problems remains deficient. The reality is still that “more
attention needs to be paid to the possibility of support
systems that might allow more mothers to be parents to
their children”.55 In 2008, Pivot Legal Society published a
report on the child welfare system in British Columbia and
the inadequacies of current child protection practices,
despite legislative reform and other changes.56 One of the
report’s conclusions was that:
53

BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 100.

54

Kline, supra note 21 at 320 [emphasis in original; footnote omitted].

55

Mosoff et al, supra note 31 at 502.

56

Pivot Legal Society, supra note 40.
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Approaches to protecting children remain
individualistic, crisis driven and devoid of a
real commitment to supporting universal
public programs that would reduce poverty
and the social and economic stresses on all
parents. Although the colonial history of this
province and ongoing discrimination against
Aboriginal people are well recognized,
comprehensive attempts to address the
economic, social and cultural impacts of this
legacy have not been forthcoming.57
Furthermore, the 2015 Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada’s 94 calls to action illustrate the
breadth of areas in which more work is required to
ameliorate the harms caused by the residential school
system.58 The first section features five calls to action that
concern child welfare, including a call for “the federal,
provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal governments to
develop culturally appropriate parenting programs for
Aboriginal families”.59 The state’s unwillingness so far to
prioritize solutions that target the consequences of colonial
oppression has created conditions that enable desperate and
tragic situations to arise.

57

Ibid at 119 [emphasis added].

58

Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Calls to
Action (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada,
2015).

59

Ibid at number 5.
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In M.M. v. T.B., the facts highlight how issues such
as T.B.’s addiction and B.B.’s health troubles were dealt
with reactively, as problems appeared; had there been
greater effort in the past by the state to invest in and
implement meaningful programs aimed at improving the
circumstances of Indigenous peoples, T.B. may have been
more ready and capable of caring for R when he was born.
Instead, when cocaine was discovered in R’s system at
birth, he was removed from T.B.’s custody and “[h]e
remained in the Ministry’s care for five months” until B.B.
was able to obtain legal custody and guardianship of her
grandson.60 Time and money were used to remove R from
T.B., and to resolve B.B.’s application to gain custody of
him, when perhaps those resources would have been better
spent on tackling the root issues. Dr. Dawn Memee LavellHarvard and Dr. Jeannette Corbiere Lavell wrote that
“[a]lthough billions of dollars are allocated each year for
programs and support services, clearly the funding
allocations and priorities have failed to acknowledge, much
less actually address, the unique needs of Aboriginal
women in a modern context”.61 They argued that, in light
of how Indigenous women are disproportionately
marginalized, “rather than continuing to funnel money into
social assistance programs, child welfare agencies,
correction systems, and emergency shelters, targeted
funding is necessary to provide Aboriginal women with
sufficient personal safety and appropriate social supports”
so that they are empowered to care for their families and
themselves.62
60

See MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 6.

61

Lavell-Harvard & Corbiere Lavell, supra note 47 at 107.

62

Ibid at 119.
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“In 2013, after the commencement of the
underlying adoption proceeding, [T.B.] deposed that she
had been clean and sober for two years”,63 but by that point
her son had already lived with M.M. and R.M. for several
years. The relationship had been fundamentally changed.
During the years of turmoil, when she struggled with
addiction, homelessness, and incarceration, T.B.
nonetheless visited R a handful of times and maintained a
degree of connection.64 Despite successfully turning her
life around later on, T.B. had already lost the “privilege” of
motherhood.65 Had there been more effective support from
the state earlier in her life, the situation could have been
avoided altogether. Dr. Lavell-Harvard and Dr. Corbiere
Lavell asserted that funding for better programs is “not
only an investment in individual women”, but a venture
that creates “ripples . . . in the larger communities”.66 The
empowerment of Indigenous women “will generate
stronger heathier families, improved circumstances for
future generations of Aboriginal children and
grandchildren, and ultimately stronger healthier Aboriginal
communities”.67
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THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING
INDIGENOUS IDENTITY
As discussed above, Professor Kline’s article revealed that
the first way in which the dominant ideology of
motherhood affects Indigenous women in child welfare
proceedings is by blaming them as individuals and
obscuring the true roots of their difficulties: a long history
of colonialism and oppression.68 She argued that the
second impact of the ideology is that it “impose[s]
dominant cultural values and practices relating to child care
upon First Nations. Correspondingly, it devalues First
Nations child care ethics and practices, as well as First
Nation communities as places to raise children”.69
Given that the reasons in M.M. v. T.B. are largely
preoccupied with how much and how best to preserve R’s
Indigenous heritage and cultural identity, Professor Kline’s
second observation is perhaps an imperfect tool for
analyzing this case. For example, she suggested that the
dominant ideology of motherhood leads to insufficient
recognition by the courts for collective child-raising
methods; in Indigenous communities, collective childraising is a common approach where extended family
members actively participate in caregiving.70 This is not a
core issue in M.M. v. T.B. The suitability of B.B., R’s
grandmother, assisting T.B. with his upbringing is not
questioned, and indeed, M.M. and R.M. shared childraising responsibilities for R with B.B. prior to the
68
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breakdown of their friendship.71 The problem is less that
the trial judge and the Court of Appeal failed to appreciate
the value of Indigenous identity and practices, and more
that their actual understanding of Indigenous identity was
flawed and incomplete. In the years since Professor Kline’s
article was published, the courts have learned to show
greater consideration for Indigenous culture, and the
legislature has placed increased and explicit emphasis on
respecting Indigenous heritage.72 M.M. v. T.B. is evidence
that the need to preserve Indigenous identity receives
attention from the courts, but the case also illustrates the
shortcomings of the courts’ overall perspective on
Indigenous culture, which can disadvantage Indigenous
mothers in child welfare and adoption proceedings.
At the Court of Appeal, counsel for T.B. raised a
number of concerns about the trial judge’s account of
Indigenous identity, arguing in particular that:
. . . the judge’s observation that the
respondent mother [M.M.] is Indigenous, and
that the child can learn about First Nations
through the respondents’ weekly activities
with the child and his siblings at a First
Nations association in their community,
amounts to insufficient consideration of the
s[ection] 3(2) factor as the child would not
learn about the Secwepemc culture. Counsel
submits that the judge’s observation is
“indicative of an outdated and colonial
71
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characterization of all Indigenous Nations
being alike, regardless of the differences
among the 198 First Nations in British
Columbia.”73
It is troubling how comfortably the Court dismissed
this critique. First, they noted that neither B.B. nor T.B.
speaks the Shuswap language and that T.B.’s eldest
daughter is teaching herself via the internet, but they did so
in a noticeably less sensitive manner than the trial judge did
in her decision.74 Madam Justice Fenlon commented that
“it is sadly the case that the respondents [T.B. and B.B.] do
not speak Shuswap either, other than a few words. N.K.
attributed this to the removal of his generation to residential
schools”.75 By not acknowledging the painful history
underlying the loss of language, the Court of Appeal failed
to appropriately recognize the gravity of T.B.’s argument.
The Court also concluded that “the adoptive parents
have done everything they could reasonably have done to
ensure that the child learns about, participates in, and
appreciates the significance of his Aboriginal heritage and
culture. The evidence is clear that the child knows about
his particular Band and First Nation, and speaks with pride
about being Aboriginal”.76 As such, even if the Court
agreed that section 3(2) deserves more weight than the
other factors listed in section 3(1),77 M.M. and R.M.’s
73
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actions still would have adequately preserved R’s cultural
identity.78 Similarly, the trial judge emphasized that M.M.
is Indigenous and therefore “well-able to maintain the
contact between R and his First Nations heritage”.79 The
trial judge listed evidence of M.M.’s extensive
involvement with her community and highlighted the M
family’s “weekly activities at the Lake Country Native
Association, including smudging, drumming and
powwows. . . . [M.M.] practic[es] First Nations spirituality
at home, tell[s] traditional stories, and engag[es] in First
Nations crafts and artwork”.80 The trial judge ultimately
determined that “[w]hile, as Chief Christian testified, there
are unique aspects of the Shuswap traditions, it is clear that
there are also many similarities”.81
Both the trial decision and the appeal decision seem
to reveal a problematic willingness to accept that different
First Nations are, to some degree, interchangeable. The
Court of Appeal insisted that R’s knowledge of the Splatsin
Band and Shuswap Nation are satisfactory, and that M.M.
and R.M. did a perfectly reasonable job with teaching him,
thereby implying that there is no need to consider whether
a member of the Shuswap Nation may have had more
insight to offer. The trial judge was even more blunt,
concluding that there are plenty of similarities between
Shuswap traditions and those of other First Nations. As a
result, M.M. v. T.B. works to reinforce the harmful idea that
all First Nations are one homogenous group. Contrary to
78
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the suggestion in the trial decision, different First Nations
practice different spirituality, tell different traditional
stories, and craft different artwork. It is vital that
“Aboriginal people [be] . . . understood in their own
contexts. Non-Aboriginal people often fail to understand
the sheer diversity and multiplicity and shifting identities
of Aboriginal people.”82 In Wrapping Our Ways Around
Them: Aboriginal Communities and the Child, Family and
Community Service Act (CFCSA) Guidebook, Ardith
Walkem—a lawyer and member of the Nlaka'pamux
Nation—wrote that “[e]fforts to maintain a child’s
Aboriginal cultural heritage are often generic, reflecting a
failure to understand the child’s unique cultural identity. . .
. Pan-Aboriginal daycares, play groups or cultural events
should not be read as sufficient”.83 The courts should be
working to show greater respect for the diversity within the
Indigenous population, and to acknowledge that each
culture is distinctive and important. As Professor Hadley
Friedland cautioned, there is a “difficulty [to] outside legal
decision-makers, who are embedded in a context that has
historically devalued Aboriginal peoples and culture,

82
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evaluating the
children”.84

cultural

connections

of

Aboriginal

The Chief of the Band and the Director of Band
Services testified at trial that, “while [the Band] supported
the child residing with the respondents [M.M. and R.M.],
they were opposed to the respondents’ adoption of the child
as in principle they opposed any adoption to persons
outside of the Band.”85 The Band’s reluctance to support
the new and permanent legal relationship that would be
created by R’s adoption must be viewed in light of their
history, but once again the Court of Appeal did not
comment on context. The trial judge, at the very least,
recognized that “[t]he Splatsin Band was decimated by the
removal of children to residential schools and the ‘60s
scoop,’ the adoption of Aboriginal children into Caucasian
homes”.86 As Justice Belobaba stated in Brown v. Canada
(Attorney General), “[t]here is . . . no dispute about the fact
that great harm was done [by the Sixties Scoop]. The
‘scooped’ children lost contact with their families. They
lost their aboriginal language, culture and identity”.87 He
added that “the loss of their aboriginal identity left the
children fundamentally disoriented”.88 The absence of
explicit appreciation that “historical injustices are a
significant factor in [the Band’s] pursuit of R’s return to his
84
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birth family and community” in the Court of Appeal’s
decision is unfortunate because these past wrongs are
related to the Band’s specific identity and journey.89 If
Indigenous cultures are essentially the same, as M.M. v.
T.B. inappropriately implies, then Indigenous mothers are
even more disadvantaged in adoption proceedings, as it is
therefore easier to discount the need for the mother to be a
link to a particular First Nation.
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
The Court of Appeal accepted that “the child has no sense
of loss about not being with his biological family”.90 R’s
contentment with his adopted parents and siblings is
unsurprising, given that he has resided with M.M. and R.M.
since he was less than two years old. However, the
possibility remains that he will experience repercussions
later in his life. As Professor Raven Sinclair noted,
“[a]djustment to adoption in Aboriginal children appears to
deteriorate as the children get older, with a reported
adoption breakdown rate of 85% (McKenzie and Hudson,
1985) with Adams (2002) noting that rate is as high as
95%”.91 Professor Sinclair was writing about “transracial
89
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adoption” specifically—“adoption of a child from one
ethnic group into another ethnic group”92—but her
observations may nonetheless be relevant, given that M.M.
belongs to a different First Nation than R and R.M. is not
Indigenous at all. Complications and harm that are not
immediately apparent may manifest in the future.
Despite the logical and laudable rationale behind
prioritizing the child’s best interests, there are also other
losses resulting from R’s adoption that merit at least some
attention. As Professor Friedland argued, “the best interests
of Aboriginal children are inseparable from the best
interests of their community, and . . . their individual losses
are equally inseparable from the larger community’s
losses. . . . [I]n the imperfect present, our concerns over one
type of loss must not silence or subordinate our concern
over another.”93 Considering the long history of
colonialism and racial oppression of Indigenous peoples,
as well as the role that child removal has played throughout
the years, decisions such as M.M. v. T.B. have a deep
impact on communities as a whole. Furthermore, as
Professor Mosoff and her colleagues observed in their
article, “[i]deologically, mothers’ rights are often
constructed as oppositional to the rights of their children,
which undermines the connection that exists between
them”.94 Rather than conceptualizing child welfare
proceedings as situations that mothers must lose so that
their children may triumph, the legal system should work
92
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on understanding how their interests interact, and how they
both affect the broader community’s wellbeing.
In her decision, the trial judge included a reference
to Racine v. Woods, a case from the Supreme Court of
Canada.95 As part of her reasoning for why the adoption
order should be granted, Madam Justice Fenlon drew on
the point from Racine that the “significance of cultural
background and heritage as opposed to bonding abates over
time. The closer the bond that develops with the
prospective adoptive parents the less important the racial
element becomes.”96 Counsel for T.B. submitted that
Racine is outdated and “demonstrate[s] a lack of
understanding of the importance of Indigenous culture to
Indigenous children”, but the Court of Appeal rejected this
claim, holding that Racine was still good law and that the
comment used by the trial judge is “simply a matter of
common sense”.97 In doing so, the Court of Appeal
affirmed a disappointingly unthoughtful view of the
relationship between Indigenous children and Indigenous
communities. Not only is a diminishing awareness of
Indigenous identity, in fact, very consequential for a child,
it also has a serious effect on the community that has lost
that child. Ardith Walkem noted that “Aboriginal
communities have consistently argued that the Racine
analysis fails to adequately or fully reflect the life-long
importance of cultural identity and connections”.98 In
95
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addition, Professor Annie Bunting wrote that “[p]reserving
connections between children and their Aboriginal heritage
may be crucial for communities whose traditions,
languages, and survival can be at risk after years of removal
of children from Aboriginal homes.”99 The reasoning in
M.M. v. T.B. ignores the trauma Indigenous communities
have endured, and their resulting need to ensure that future
generations are able to help protect the communities’
continued existence.
Despite the efforts of T.B.’s counsel to frame “the
present case as ‘an opportunity for the Court to right an
historical wrong’ by refusing to remove [R] from his birth
family the way so many First Nations children were
removed from their families and communities and sent to
residential schools and non-aboriginal homes”, the Court
of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that “it is neither
appropriate nor possible for this Court in an adoption
proceeding to right historical wrongs. [R] is not a symbolic
figurehead. He is a real little boy.”100 However, all
adoption proceedings—as well as child welfare
proceedings—involve real little children. The cases cannot
and should not undervalue the importance of the colonial
context. Even if the children are not symbolic figureheads,
the outcomes in their cases have symbolic meaning to the
Indigenous communities from which they are too often
disconnected.
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The Court of Appeal did not accept counsel for
T.B.’s submission that “s[ection] 3(2) should be interpreted
for the purpose of ensuring ‘substantive equality’ and
‘amelioration’ of the historical injustices to Indigenous
peoples”.101 They determined that the provision of the
Adoption Act does not attract a “super-weight” over the
other factors, and that the text of the section does not allow
for an expanded interpretation.102 But as Professor Bunting
observed, “factors such as stability, bonding, and
economics have tended to trump a child’s connection to her
or his cultural heritage”.103 In other words, it is hard for
Indigenous identity to play as significant a role in the
assessment of a child’s best interests as the rest of the
factors listed in the Adoption Act. Moreover, “[t]he weight
the judge attaches to preserving the child’s Aboriginal
heritage and culture, along with the relevant factors under
s[ection] 3(1), is an exercise of discretion based on the
evidentiary record”.104 As such, “absent a failure to
consider a relevant factor, failure to give any weight or
sufficient weight to a relevant factor, or where the decision
is clearly wrong”, the judge’s decision is entitled to
substantial deference.105 This means that Indigenous
mothers who wish to challenge a trial judge’s consideration
of section 3(2) face an even more difficult battle.
Given that Indigenous communities need greater
emphasis to be placed on a child’s cultural identity, but
101

MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 96.

102

Ibid at para 15.

103

Bunting, supra note 99 at 153.

104

MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 94 [emphasis added].

105

Ibid.

210

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

courts are unable and unwilling to put more weight on that
factor when deciding adoption cases, perhaps there should
be a change to the legislation in British Columbia so that a
super-weight for Indigenous heritage and cultural identity
is formally recognized. This would not be a novel idea. As
the Court of Appeal noted in M.M. v. T.B., “the Nova Scotia
Legislature did ‘super-weight’ the factor in s[ection] 47(5)
of the Children and Family Services Act”:106
Permanent care and custody order107
47 (5) Where practicable, a child, who is the
subject of an order for permanent care and
custody, shall be placed with a family of the
child’s own culture, race, religion or
language but, if such placement is not
available within a reasonable time, the child
may be placed in the most suitable home
available with the approval of the Minister.
This kind of explicit legislative direction could help
strengthen Indigenous communities, which could, in turn,
make adoption cases with Indigenous children less
common.
However, it is worth noting that T.B., B.B., and the
Splatsin Band were unable to prevent R’s adoption despite
the unique legislative advantage that the Splatsin Band
already has in the realm of Indigenous child welfare. In
106
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1980, the Splatsin Band passed A By-law for the Care of
Our Indian Children: Spallumcheen Indian Band By-law
#3-1980,108 which “gives to the Band exclusive jurisdiction
over any proceeding involving the removal of a child from
their family”.109 The bylaw applies “to all Splatsin . . .
[children] no matter where they are living, even if they do
not live on Splatsin reserve”.110 It is recognized by both the
provincial government and the federal government,111 and
“[i]t is the only child welfare bylaw which has been
allowed under s[ection] 81 of the Indian Act”.112 But
nevertheless, this seemingly powerful resource was
ultimately ineffective at stopping R’s adoption into a
family outside of the Splatsin Band. In fact, the bylaw
receives little mention in either the trial or appeal decisions.
As seen from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s
calls to action, there must be greater empowerment and
respect for Indigenous peoples in every aspect of life—not
just piecemeal solutions—in order for Indigenous mothers
and their children to thrive.
CONCLUSION
This paper did not set out to argue that the outcome in M.M.
v. T.B. was incorrect. Rather, the purpose has been to
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explore the analysis in both the trial decision and the appeal
decision in hopes of uncovering insights about the
experiences of Indigenous mothers in child welfare and
adoption proceedings today. Professor Marlee Kline’s
groundbreaking article on the dominant ideology of
motherhood served as a springboard for understanding how
Indigenous women are more vulnerable to being
characterized as unfit mothers, and more recent scholarship
confirms that unfortunately Professor Kline’s observations
about the expectations of mothers are still true. The law has
not changed dramatically from when she published her
article. Also, although the courts are paying more attention
to Indigenous identity when considering a child’s best
interests, the judgments from M.M. v. T.B. demonstrate
how the courts’ perspective in this area can lack depth and
nuance. While there may be acknowledgment of the
wrongs done to Indigenous peoples in general, individuals’
actions and behaviour are still not being understood in
relation to the broader context of colonial oppression.
In April of 2018, the Ministry of Children and
Family Development introduced Bill 26: the Child, Family
and Community Service Amendment Act.113 The aim is to
ensure that “Indigenous communities will have greater
involvement in child-welfare decisions to help keep their
children out of care, safe in their home communities, and
connected to their cultures”.114 The government’s news
release states that:
113
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If approved by the legislature, the proposed
changes will allow MCFD to share more
information with Indigenous communities
right from the start to keep children from
coming into care in the first place, and will
give the ministry more opportunities to work
collaboratively on planning and caring for
Indigenous children . . .115
The news release acknowledges that “[t]he
proposed changes are an interim step”, and that work on
“systemic reform and jurisdiction, including consideration
of [the] United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples . . . and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Calls to Action”, must continue.116 It remains
to be seen whether Bill 26 will be effective at improving
the lives of Indigenous mothers and their children.117 If
Indigenous communities are to be truly supported so they
encounter less friction with the court system, the
government will still need to commit to wide-ranging,
substantial changes and invest in comprehensive,
meaningful social programs aimed at addressing the legacy
of colonialism.
115

Ibid.

116

Ibid.

117

The BC Aboriginal Justice Council has already expressed concerns
about the proposed amendments, stating that the changes “were
developed unilaterally, with limited opportunities for Indigenous
comments, rather than meaningful active involvement of Indigenous
Nations in authoring the legislation”. See: BC Aboriginal Justice
Council, “Statement from the BC Aboriginal Justice Council on Bill
26 (2018) Child, Family and Community Service Amendment Act” (26
April
2018),
online:
<http://bcajc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/BCAJC-Bill-C-26-Press-Release-final.pdf>.

214

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

